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Abstract
We estimate a labor supply model on a random sample of Swedish
male and female blue collar workers to study the e¤ect of economic
incentives on work absence behavior. We observe work absence for
each day during 1990 and 1991 for each worker in the sample. We use
non-parametric (Kaplan-Meier) techniques; semi-parametric strati-
…ed models, where individual e¤ects are removed; and fully paramet-
ric Cox regression models, where observed characteristics are used to
control for heterogeneity. An exogenous change in the cost of being
absent due to a reform of the sickness insurance, which took place
during the time period covered by the data, is used as identifying
information. The empirical analysis is focused on explaining gender
di¤erences in work absence behavior. We …nd that about one third
of this di¤erence in our sample can be attributed to di¤erences in
costs of being absent.
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The large ‡uctuations in the work absence rate in most European coun-
tries during recent decades have attracted considerable attention. Most
workers, in most countries, are covered by some form of sickness insur-
ance, which is regulated by labor market legislation.1 As a result, the
coinsurance in these insurance schemes, and the extent to which economic
incentives a¤ect work absence in general, have been scrutinized in the
public policy debate. See Lantto (1991) for a theoretical analysis of the
coinsurance in the sickness insurance. The impact of the unemployment
rateand thebusinesscycleingeneral onhealthand work-absencebehavior
have also been discussed extensively. A furtherissuethat has been consid-
eredin theliteratureis that femaleson averagehavea higher work-absence
rateas compared to men. Thisis regarded as moreor less a “stylized fact”
in empirical studies on worker absenteeism (see e.g. VandenHeuvel and
Wooden, 1995 or Vistnes, 1997). Can this gender di¤erence in observed
work-absence behavior be explained by di¤erences in economic incentives
for being absent, preferences or di¤erences in health and work environ-
ment?
To gain an understanding of this issue, we examine microdata from
a sample of 1; 396 blue-collar workers obtained from the Swedish Level
of Living Survey (SLLS) matched with information on work absence for
each day during the years 1990 and 1991. The data on work absence were
obtained from registers of actual transactions compiled by the National
Social Insurance Board.
During the time period covered by the data two important policy
changes, which radically altered the cost and virtual income2 underly-
ing workers’ work absencedecision, took place. First, as of March 1, 1991,
the replacement rate was decreased from 90 percent of labor earnings be-
low the social security ceiling to 65 percent for the …rst three days of a
sickness spell, to 80 percent from day 4 to day 89, and remained at 90
percent after day 90. Second, an income tax reform, whereby marginal
tax rates were drastically reduced, was implemented in January 1, 1991.
The usual empirical evidence of more work absence among females is
also found in our data (seeTables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix 2). The mean
di¤erence in number of days absent in 1990 and 1991 are 4:5 and 6 days,
1See Kangas (1991) for an international overview.
2The income received when absent from work.
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this di¤erence can be attributed to more frequent, rather than longer,
work-absence spells for the females.
The e¤ect of economic incentives on work absence has been studied in
a number of papers (see e.g. Allen, 1981a, or Barmby, Orme and Treble,
1996). In particular, two previouspapers, Johanssonand Palme (1996 and
2002) analyze the e¤ect of economic incentives generated by the Swedish
compulsory sickness insurance on work absence. As in this study, a labor
supply model is used to derivethe empirical speci…cation of work absence.
There are, however, several di¤erences, both in the empirical focus and
methodology, between these papers and the present study. Here we focus
on gender di¤erences in work absence behavior. This, however, requires
that the e¤ect of economic incentives - and also work environment, health
status and macroeconomic conditions - on work absence are measured in
a …rst step.
Johansson and Palme (1996) uses individual data on work absence
behavior aggregated over one year. The between individual variation in
virtual income and the cost of being absent is used to estimate - using a
semiparametric count data regression model - the e¤ect of economic in-
centives on work absence. Johansson and Palme (2002) uses the same
data as in the present study and binomial logit models are used to model
the choice between being absent and working. Unobserved heterogene-
ity is controlled for by …xed e¤ects. Di¤erent speci…cations for duration
dependence are applied in the work and work absence spells respectively.
The empirical analysis in this paper is divided into three parts. First,
weuseKaplan-Meierestimates(KaplanandMeier, 1958) to non-parametr-
ically study gender as well as pre- and post-reform di¤erences in work
absence behavior. Second, we use discrete time Cox regressions where
heterogeneity is controlled for by a large set of individual characteristics
(primarily on health status and work placecharacteristics). Third, we use
a strati…ed analysis (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990, Chapter 9). This analysis
is feasible since there are repeated spells of work absence and since the
reform of the sickness insurance radically altered the cost of being absent
from work for the group of workers that we examine.
For all three estimators we …nd that economic incentives, through the
cost ofbeingabsent, matterforwork-absencebehavior. About onethird of
the male-femaledi¤erencein work absencecan beattributed to di¤erences
in economic incentives to be present at work. The remaining two thirds
4 IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behaviorcannot be explained by observable characteristics. Our interpretation of
this result is that most of the gender di¤erence in work absence behavior
are due to intrinsic gender behavioral di¤erences. This supports previous
…ndings by e.g. Paringer (1983) and Nilsson (2001). Paringer (1983) uses
the observation from Sindelar (1982) that women invest more in their
health, to explain more frequent female work absence spells.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie‡y describe the
sicknessinsuranceand incometaxesin Sweden. Section 3 speci…estheeco-
nomicmodel for work absence behaviorand Section 4 presents the estima-
tion procedures. The data are described and analyzed non-parametrically
in Section 5. Section 6 reports the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Sickness insurance and income taxes in Sweden
Sweden hasacompulsory sicknessinsurancescheme.3 It is…nancedthrough
a proportional tax rate levied on wages and replaces forgone earnings due
to temporary health problems that prevent the insured worker from do-
ing his regular job. Sickness insurance is administrated by local insurance
o¢ces. Since it is very hard to judge whether or not a worker is able to
perform his regular job, monitoring against abuse is very light during the
…rst six days in a sickness spell. However, a certi…cate from a physician
is required to be entitled to sickness insurance payments as of theseventh
day in a spell.
The replacement level, the share of labor earnings paid to the worker
by the insurance, has changed on several occasions in recent years. In the
major reform covered by our longitudinal data - in March 1, 1991 - the
replacement level was decreased from being 90 percent of labor earnings
below the social security ceiling4 from the …rst day in a sickness spell, to
65 percent in the …rst three days in a spell and to 80 percent from day
four to day 89.
An insured worker’s economic incentives for being absent from work
are also a¤ected by income taxes. Sweden has an integrated income tax
3For a more detailed description of the sickness insurance, see Johansson and Palme
(2002).
4In 1995, about 6.7 percent of all insured workers had labor earning above the social
security ceiling (see, National Social Insurance Board, 1997). For a description on the
construction and indexation of the social insurance ceiling see Palme and Svensson
(1998).
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national government determines the tax base for both taxes. The local
tax is proportional and is determined by each of Sweden’s 288 local gov-
ernments, although some income redistribution does take place between
high- and low-income municipalities. In 1991, the local government tax
rate varied between 26.87 and 33.48 percent.
Sweden’s income tax system underwent a radical change after the tax
reform in 1991. The …rst year of our data thus covers the pre-reform
system and the second year pertains to the post-reform system. This tax
reform encompassed threefundamental changes. First, from being uni…ed
in the pre-reform tax system, the tax base was divided into earned and
capital income. Second, marginal tax rates were reduced substantially.
Figure1 shows therelationbetweentaxableincomeandmarginal tax rates
under the pre- and post-reform income tax regimes, respectively. For the
calculations underlying the …gure, the local government tax rate is set at
31 percent. As can be seen, the highest marginal tax rate was reduced
from the local government tax rate plus a 42 percent national tax rate
(with a maximum set at 75 percent in a combined marginal tax rate) to a
20 percent national tax rate in addition to the local government tax. It is
also evident from Figure 1 that most full-time wage earners, in the income
interval between 70 000 and 170 000 Swedish kronor (SEK), did receive
substantial reductions in their marginal tax rates. The marginal tax rate
decreased in some income intervals in the post-reform regime because the
basic deduction was made income dependent, i.e., it rises with income in
some intervals and decreases with income in other intervals.
Finally, the third main component of the tax reform was a substantial
increaseinchild and housing allowances. Thechild allowance, whichvaries
with the number of children is independent of the parents’ income, was
increased by about one third. For example, the child allowance for the
…rst child in a family was increased from SEK 6; 720 to SEK 9;000 per
year. The housing allowance is means tested. The amount is determined
by the individual’s earnings two years before he or she actually receives
the allowance payment, and by his or her housing costs. The magnitude
of the increase in the housing allowance was about the same as that for
the child allowance.
































Figure1: Percentagemarginal tax rates in thepre- and post-1991 Swedish
income tax reform regimes, respectively; taxable income in thousands of
SEK.
3 Modelling absence from work
3.1 General speci…cation of the hazard functions
Thee¤ect ofeconomicincentivesonwork-absencebehaviorhasbeenexam-
ined in several empirical and theoretical studies (see e.g. Barmby, Orme
and Treble, 1996, Barmby and Sibly, 1999, Johansson and Palme, 1996
and 2002). These studies analyze di¤erent costs of absence from work. In
Sweden, as in most other industrialized countries with a compulsory sick-
ness insurance, the direct cost of being absent corresponds to the share of
daily earnings not covered by the sickness insurance.
In order to de…ne the cost and virtual income variables, let us …rst
de…ne the worker’s daily budget set. Let Lj represents leisure time at day
j: Lj consists of two components: contracted leisure time, tl
j and time in
work absence ta
j (that is Lj =tl
j +ta
j). Assume that the contracted leisure
time is …xed over the time period studied (two years), i.e., tl
j ´ tl. The
daily budget constraint can then be de…ned as
xj +(1 ¡–j)wjta
j = wjtc +Rj;
where xj is daily consumption, tc is the contracted number of daily work-
ing hours, Rj is income from sources other than labor, wj is net hourly
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Assuming that the worker maximize a conditional (on the duration in the
present spell) utility function which includes weakly separable consump-
tions of goods, services and leisure time, it is straight forward to obtain
the following general demand function for time absent
¿a
j = f (tc; wj(1¡–j); Rj +tcwj–j; sj; "j; Durj) =f
¡




where Durj denotes the duration in the present spell (in either work or
work absence), cj = wj(1 ¡–j) and „j = Rj +tcwj–j are the cost and
virtual income of being absent, respectively; sj is a vector of observable
characteristics and "j captures unobservable personal characteristics and
random errors.
As a local approximation, let the conditional demand function at day
j in a spell of absence or work be linear, hence
¿a
j = q0
j® +￿j +￿ +·j; (2)
where qj = (tc; cj;„j;s0
j)0, ® is a parameter vector, ￿j is a duration para-
meter, ￿ represent unobservables and ·j isa random error, i.e. "j = ￿+·j.
Assuming ·j to be complementary log-log the probability to be absent (or






;j = 1;::; T:
This probability to be absent, conditional on being absent (or in work), is
the discrete time Cox regression model (see e.g. Kalb‡eich and Prentice,
1980, Chapter 4).
Inthecontinuous time(t); thismodel istheproportional hazard model
‚(t;q(t)) =h0(t)￿exp(q(t)
0®); (3)
where h0(t) is the baseline density, ￿ = exp(￿) and ￿j = ln(
Rtj
tj¡1 h0(t));
t0 = 0 and tJ = 1 (see e.g. Kalb‡eich and Prentice, 1980, Chapter 4).
The continuous time speci…cation is useful since we have the possibility,
due to repeated spells, to remove the unobserved heterogeneity term ￿
using a strati…ed approach (see below).
Di¤erencesin preferences for absenceand di¢culties in measuring sec-
ondary costs5 of being absent are two possible causes of unobserved het-
5This is the cost of being absent in addition to the direct cost; such as a lower
probability of being promoted, an increased probability of losing one’s job and foregone
on-the-job training.
8 IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behaviorerogeneity, represented by ￿ in the model. This heterogeneity may, in
turn, be correlated with both c and „.
E¢ciency wage theory predictsthat an employer may pay an employee
somewhat more than the market wage in order to elicit the employee not
to shirk. Some work absence may be interpreted as a form of shirking.
Jobs di¤er in terms of the cost of absenteeism for the employer (see e.g.
Weiss, 1985). That is, it may be pro…table for an employer to pay some
employees more in order to give them incentives which prevent them from
being absent from work.
There might also be compensating wage di¤erentials for the option of
being absent from work. Jobs that enablea worker to beabsent will, other
things equal, have a lower wage rate.6
Preferences for work-absence are most likely a¤ected by a worker’s
health status. It is an empirical fact that workers with bad health on av-
erage have a higher work-absence rate than workers without health prob-
lems. For some jobs, it is reasonable to assume that workers with bad
health are less productive and therefore earn less than those with good
health status.
Some di¤erences in preferences for work absence may not be driven
primarily by health di¤erences. An individual with strong preferences for
work absence will, on average during his or her career, be absent more
hours. If there are economic returns to on-the-job training, such individ-
uals will, everything else equal, earn less.
All four of the above hypotheses will create an correlation between
the heterogeneity and the wage; in the hazards to work and work absence
we expect, a negative and a positive relation, respectively. Since both
the cost of being absent and virtual income are related to the wage rate,
unobserved heterogeneity is not likely to beindependent ofthesevariables.
3.2 Empirical speci…cation
Sincethebothfemalesandmalesmay di¤erin theirwork absencebehavior
whether in work or in work absence we allow for state dependent utilities.












; i =1; :: :; N; (4)
6Allen (1981b) examines, and …nds some support for, this hypothesis empirically.
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‚WA(t;zit) = hWA





; i =1; :: :;N;
(5)
where W and WA indicate work and work-absence states, respectively; i
is an index for the N individuals included in the sample; zit = (cit;„it;
UNEMPit;DAY0
it)0 are time invariant covariates.
As a measure of the secondary cost of a work absence monthly unem-
ployment rate in the county, UNEMP, is included in the model. If the
unemployment rate is relatively high on the local labor market where the
workeris active, theworker’s cost of losing his job is likely to be relatively
high; the search cost of …nding a new job is on average higher in labor
markets with high unemployment rate.
For several institutional reasons, the work-absence rate di¤er between
di¤erent days of the year. Therefore, the vector DAY contains several
di¤erent indicator variables. Since weekends are not included in the reg-
ular work schedule for most workers there is a clear “weekday-pattern”
when work-absence spells begins and ends. Therefore, a weekday factor
(Mon; Tue;:::::Sun) and an indicator variable for public holidays (Holi)7
are included in the speci…cation.
There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that work absence is higher on
days between public holidays and Saturdays (or Sundays ifthere happens
to be only one day between the public holiday and the weekend). To
allow for such an e¤ect, and indeed to test if it is supported by data,
we include a dummy variable, BH; which is one for days between public
holidays and weekends. Finally, although an insured worker is entitled to
compensation on holidays, it is an empirical fact that most workers do not
usethat possibility. To control for that, an indicator for themonth during
which most industrial workers are on vacation, July; is included.
The heterogeneity is modelled as ￿k
i = x0





i)0; CIV is a vector
of indicators for marital status and number of dependent children; AGE
is a the individual’s age;8 HEALTH is a vector of indicator variables
measuring di¤erent aspects of the individual’s health status; WENV is
7Seven days for each year.
8One way of measuring di¤erences in the cost of forgone on-the-job training, is
to use the well-known result from human capital theory (see Willis, 1986) that the
bene…ts of on-the-job training are higher if such training takes place relatively early in
the worker’s career, as the wage increase due to improved skills is earned for a longer
10 IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behaviora vector of indicator variables measuring the individual’s work environ-
ment; and CONTR is a vector of variables measuring employer monitor-
ing. The employer has several means of contributing to lower frequency
of work absence. These include direct monitoring as well as pay schemes
that provideincentivesfor the worker to be present. Our data set contains
some information that can be used to measure di¤erences in employers’
level of monitoring which are contained in the CONTR vector. These
include whether thereis a time-clock at theworkplace, CLOCK, whether
the worker has ‡exible working hours, FLEX, and, …nally, whether it is
important to be on time, INTIME.
Now since ￿i is modelled by including time-invariant covariates the










; j =1;: ::; T¡1; i =1; :::;N and
k =WA or W: (6)
Since we have multiple spells in both work and work absence it is
possible to use a strati…ed approach to test whether or not the included
covarites xi in (6) are su¢cient to remove the confounding heterogeneity.
4 Estimation
4.1 Proportional hazards for discrete time data
The log-likelihood function for the discrete time Cox regression with the
parameter vectors °k = (￿k
1;:::; ￿k























; k =W; WA;
period of time. The cost of work absence owing to forgone on-the-job training is thus
likely to be inversely related to a worker’s age. This result cannot be used empirically,
however, since a worker’s health is also likely to depend on age, which, in turn, a¤ect
his preferences for work absence. Therefore, it is not possible to identify the di¤erences
in costs of work absence owing to general health depreciation by age.
IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behavior 11where Dj is the set of observations with spell length j, j =1; :: :; (T ¡1)
and Rj is the set of observations with spell lengths longer than or equal
to j.9
A statistically correct methodfortreating thespells which begin before
the start of the time period under study and continue during this period,
is to condition on the spell length on January 1, 1990. This could not
be done here, however, because we only have information about the state
(W or WA) an individual is in at the beginning of the period, not how
long he or she has been in that state. Instead, we used two methods for
handling this problem: …rst, a “generous” method where the interval in
which a spell starts is counted fully; and second, a “restrictive” approach
where a spell is accounted for only in intervals which contain the start of
the interval.
Out of a total of8,145 work spells, as many as 1,319 individuals or 16.2
percent, are left censored for the incidence of work absence. Note that by
throwing out these 1,319 spells, we disregard all individuals who, during
the two years studied, are never absent from work. In order to includethe
work spells starting before January 1, 1990 it is necessary to assume that
the intensity ofbeing absent from work on a particularday is independent
of the duration in work. Based on the Nelson-Aalen estimates10 of the
cumulative hazards functions for work spells (see Figure 2) we think it is
reasonable to use the non-restricted sample in the analysis of incidence of
work absence.
It is quite clear from Figure 3 that it is not appropriate to include the
left censored observations for the duration in work absence. However, the
left truncation problem is not likely to bevery severe because out of6,911
spells, only 71 individuals entered as absent from work and these spells
can safely be neglected since there are still 6,840 work-absence spells to
consider.
9The variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates is, as usual, estimated






10The cumulative hazard is estimated under the restriction ¯ = 0. Hence ^ ￿j(0) =
ln(¡ln(1 ¡ Dj=nj));where nj is the number of observations at risk in Rj.





































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: The Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard function
forthe work spells before and afterthe reform (R) for the male and female
samples, respectively. The estimates in the upper panels are based on the
full sampleand theestimatesinthelowerpanelsarebased ontherestricted
sample, i.e., including only those spells which started after January 1,
1990.
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The e¤ect of the time-varying covariates may be examined using a strati-
…ed analysis (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990, Chapter 9). The partial likelihood








where ‚k(ti(•);zijk) is given in (4) or (5), Rijk is the risk set at ti(•) for









Li(¯k);k =W; WA: (8)
Standard errors were estimated as if we had an ordinary likelihood func-
tion, using an asymptotic maximum likelihood approach.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
5.1 Data sources and measurement
We use the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey (SLLS). The SLLS is a
microdata set that contains information compiled from interviews as well
as o¢cial public registers for a random sample of about 6,000 individuals.
This survey is described in detail in Fritzell and Lundberg (1994). Data
on the dependent variable, absence from work, were obtained from the
National Social Insurance Board by matching with the SLLS sample.
Thede…nition ofwork absence isthat an individual is compensated by
the compulsory sickness insurance system a particulat day. As the data
were collected from registers of actual payments to insured individuals,
there are likely to be much less measurement errors as compared to self-
assessed data. However, ifwe de…ne work absence astimeduring which an
employee is absent from work without prior agreement with the employer
(such as holidays), then a small fraction of work absence is not likely to
be included in the sickness insurance data.11
11According to one survey, the amount was 2.9 percent in 1986 (SAF, 1986).
14 IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behaviorWerestricted thesampleto blue-collarworkersagedbetween20and64
who were employed during 1991 (theyear of the survey). The …nal sample
consisted of 1,396 individuals (738 males and 658 females). The motive
for restricting the population to blue-collar workers was to limit hetero-
geneity arising from di¤erences in sickness insurance schemes. Swedish
white-collar workers often have negotiated schemes whose rules cannot
be obtained from the available data. Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix 2
provide descriptive statistics on all variables included in our analysis.
Measuring the two variables for economic incentives encompassed by
the econometric model, the cost of being absent (c) and virtual daily in-
come from being absent („), involves several steps. Webegan by calculat-
ing the hourly real wage rate. First, we computed the income from labor
a worker would have received if he or she had not been absent from work
during 1990 and 1991 (potential income from labor), i.e., we added the
share of income not covered by sickness insurance for each day the worker
was absent during the year. Data on income from labor were compiled
from tax registers matched with the SLLS survey. It was then straight-
forward to calculate the cost of being absent from work using the pre-
and post-reform replacement levels in theinsuranceschemes, respectively.
Wethen calculated and deducted income taxes from the potential income.
Finally, we used the number of hours of work stated by the worker in the
1991 SLLS pertaining to 1990 to obtain the hourly wage rate.12
We calculated virtual income as the daily income received from sick-
ness insurancewhen aworkeris absent from work. Wealsoadded observed
labor incomefor thespouse if a worker ismarried as well as family income
from capital, child and housing allowances. Data on all of these compo-
nents were obtained from tax registers matched with the SLLS survey.
5.2 Description of spells of work and work absence
Figures3-6show Kaplan-Meier estimatesofthe survival functionforwork-
absence spells as well as work spells by di¤erent classi…cations. Figure 3
shows theoverall male-female di¤erencein exit rates from work and work-
absence spells. The …rst panel reveals male-female di¤erences in work
spells. Although the di¤erence is very small, this panel discloses that the
graph for themalesubsample exceeds thegraph for thefemalesubsample.
12We thus assume that the worker do not change his or her regular hours of work
between 1990 and 1991.
IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behavior 15This di¤erencere‡ectsthefact that women havea higherincidenceofwork
absence.
The second panel in Figure 3 displays the work-absence survival func-
tion for males and females. Both survival functions in this panel show a
similar pattern: a steep decrease until day seven, followed by a relatively
‡at segment. This clear-cut pattern is due to legislation whereby a certi…-
cate from a physician is required after day seven in a work-absence spell.
Moreover, the hazard for females is higher during spells of up to …ve days
as compared with males. Forlongerspells, thesurvival functions are quite
similar.
Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of the 1991 reform of the sickness insurance
system on the work-absence behavior. The …rst two panels in Figure 4
display the e¤ect on survival in work for men and women, respectively.
The incidence of work absence decreased markedly after the reform. It
can also be seen that women changed their behavior somewhat morethan
men.
Thethird and fourth panels of Figure 4 show that the hazard increases
somewhat during the …rst …veor six days for both men and women. After
that, the relation is reversed; the work-absence spells tend to become
longer. To someextent, thesechanges in theshape ofthesurvival function
correspond to the changes in economic incentives implied by the reform,
in the sense that the largest decrease in the replacement level of sickness
insurance, i.e., the greatest increase in the cost of being absent, pertains
to the …rst three days of an absence spell. Both genders seem to react
very similarly to the reform.
The survival functions of individuals with di¤erent health status are
shown in Figure 5. Those with bad health are de…ned as having at least
one indication of a health problem among 13 indicator variables used to
characterize health di¤erences among the individuals in the sample (see
Tables A.1 and A.2 for de…nitions as well as descriptive statistics of these
variables). About 21.1 percent if the individuals in the sample meet the
de…nition of bad health (19.8 percent among the women and 22.4 percent
among the men).
The …rst and second panels of Figure 5 show that workers with bad
health status have a somewhat higher exit rate from work spells. The
di¤erenceis very similar for men and women. Thethird and fourth panels
indicate that the exit rates for individuals with good health are always
higher than the exit rates from work-absence for those who are in bad









































































































Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of duration of work
spells (panel 1) and work-absence spells (panel 2); men and women, re-
spectively.

































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of the e¤ect of the
March 1991 reform of the sickness insurance system on work-absence be-
havior; duration of work spellsfor males (panel 1); duration of work spells
for females (panel 2); duration of work-absence spells for males (panel 3);
duration of work-absence spells for females (panel 4).

















































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of the e¤ect of health
status on work-absence behavior; duration of work spells for males (panel
1); duration of work spells for females (panel 2); duration of work-absence
spells for males (panel 3); duration of work-absence spells for females
(panel 4).

























































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of the e¤ect of work
environment on work-absence behavior; duration of work spells for males
(panel 1); duration of work spells for females (panel 2); duration of work-
absence spells for males (panel 3); duration of work-absence spells for
females (panel 4).
20 IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behaviorhealth. Menwith bad health exhibit a much lower exit ratethan men with
good health. Thedi¤erence in exit rates is smaller for women. As regards
long absence spells, however, the di¤erence between men and women is
very small.
The e¤ects of poor working conditions are explored in Figure 6. The
strategy used to de…ne bad health was also applied poor working condi-
tions. In the case of work environment, 97.2 percent of the sample (96.8
percent among the women and 98 percent among the men) are de…ned
as having poor working conditions, i.e., with at least one indication of
poor working conditions among the 13 indicator variables used to de…ne
individual di¤erences in work environment.13
The survival functions with respect to work spells for the females and
males are given in panel 1 and 2. As expected, the exit rates for women
who work in a poor environment are larger than for those in a good envi-
ronment. However, no e¤ect was found in the male sample; the third and
fourth panels of Figure 6 show that the exits rate from work absence to
work are very similar for both good and poor working conditions.
6 Results
The results from the discrete time Cox regression models (henceforth:
discrete time model) are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 reports the
results for the duration of the work spells, i.e., the incidence of the work
absence periods, and Table 2 the corresponding ones for the duration of
the work absence spells. Two di¤erent speci…cations were estimated: one
with the full set of covariates and another, restricted version, with only
time-varying covariates (the same as those used in the strati…ed analysis
for the sake of comparison). The results from the strati…ed analysis, for
both the work and work absence spells, are reported in Table 3.
The discussion of the results are divided into three sub-sections. In
the…rst one, Section 6.1, we discuss the estimates for the time-varying co-
variates, i.e., the economic incentives, the unemployment rate, indicators
for holidays and weekdays. This sub-section applies to both the discrete
timemodels and thestrati…ed analysis. Section 6.2 discusses theestimates
for the time invariant covariates which are included in the discrete time
13Figure 6 should be interpreted with caution since only 39 individuals (21 females
and 18 males) had no indication poor working conditions.
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characteristics, health status indicators and measures of work environ-
ment. Finally, Section 6.3 discusses gender di¤erences in work absence
behavior from all the results obtained in this study.
6.1 Time-varying covariates
The results show that the cost of absence from work has a signi…cant
negativeimpact on theincidenceofwork absenceforboth menandwomen
in all three models. The magnitude of the estimates are also very similar.
This result implies that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the cost
variable is uncorrelated with variables included in the …rst speci…cation
but not the second and with unobserved variables.
The e¤ect of cost on the duration in work absence is much weaker.
The only signi…cant coe¢cient estimate (at the 10 percent level) is for
femalesin thestrati…ed model. Theestimatein this model is, as expected,
positive. It is noteworthy that increasing the control for heterogeneity
leads to larger positive coe¢cients for both the female and male samples.
Since the strati…ed model is less e¢cient than the discretetime models, it
is plausible that unobserved heterogeneity does a¤ect theestimates in the
discrete time model.
Contrary to what ispredicted by theeconomicmodel, theestimatesfor
thevirtual incomevariableissigni…cantly negativein both speci…cationsof
the discrete time models for the male subsample. In the strati…ed model,
however, they are insigni…cant. That is, the results from the discrete
time models could have been caused by unobserved heterogeneity. The
same pattern emerge in the female subsample, although the estimate for
virtual income is signi…cant only in the speci…cation without controls for
observed heterogeneity. For the hazard from work absence, the virtual
income variable is insigni…cant in all speci…cations except for women in
the discretetimemodel, wheretheestimated coe¢cientsare (as expected)
negative.
According to the discussion in Section 3, we expect a positive (nega-
tive) coe¢cient for the unemployment rate on the hazard from (incidence
of) work absence. The only signi…cant estimate we obtained from this
parameter is for the female subsample in the strati…ed model, where -
contrary to expectations - the estimate in the model for the hazard from
the work absence state is negative.
22 IFAU ¡ Economic incentives and gender di¤erences in work absence behaviorThese results di¤er from those generally obtained on aggregate data
(see e.g. Lantto and Lindblom, 1987)14 as well as in previous studies
where no attempts were made to control for correlation between unob-
served heterogeneity and regressors. There are, however, explanations as
to why we may observe a spurious relation between work absence and un-
employment. It is common knowledge that work absence is lower in …rms
with few employees(see e.g. SAF, 1986) and in small communities, due to
more extensive social control. The unemployment rate in Sweden, and in
most other countries, is in general higher in small communities. This may
account for the previously observed negativecorrelation between work ab-
sence and unemployment. Furthermore, according to the results obtained
from aggregate data, the structure of the labor force changes when the
unemployment rate increases: those who become unemployed may have
previously had a higher rate of work absence than the rest of the labor
force.
There are several conceivableexplanations to theobserved result ofthe
(insigni…cant) positive correlation between the unemployment rate and
the incidence of work-absence spells. When aggregate demand decreases
at the beginning of a recession, …rms will try to lay o¤ their workers,
rather than permanently dismiss them, in order to avoid hiring, training
and …ring costs, if they expect demand to increase again later on. It
is much cheaper, although not legal, for a …rm if laid-o¤ workers claim
sickness bene…ts rather than get paid by the …rm. There is anecdotal
evidence that employers may in fact urge their employees to do so. If
this were the case, we may also observea positive correlation between the
unemployment rateandwork absenceat thebeginningofa recession, when
the unemployment rate is increasing. Moreover, a rising unemployment
rate may be …nancially stressful and thereby detrimental to health (see
e.g. Vahtera, Kivimäki and Pentti, 1997). This, in turn, may lead to a
higher rate of work absence.
The e¤ects of weekdays (with Monday as the reference), Holi, BH
and July are very similar for all estimators. The incidence of absence
from work is the highest for Sundays, i.e., most sickness spells begin on
a Monday. Thereafter, the incidence is (almost) monotonously decreasing
until Saturday, which is exactly asexpected. The results for the durations
of work-absence spells show that an individual are less likely to leave a
14This result is, however, questioned by Bäckman (1998).
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on Sundays.
The results also indicate that work-absence spells are less likely to
begin during public holidays, days between work-free days and during
July (Holi, BH and July). The results for the BH coe¢cient provide no
support for the anecdotal evidences that work absence is higher for such
days. However, the fact that some workers use vacation days and that
some employers give their employees an extra day o¤ on days between
holidays and/or work-free days may counteract an increased rate of work
absence due to abuse of the insurance schemes that may also be inherent
in the data.
6.2 Time-invariant covariates
The expected e¤ect ofcontracted numberof hoursof work, tc; is that more
contracted hours of work lead to higher rate ofwork-absence. This is also
found in our female subsample: the estimate is signi…cantly positive for
the incidence of work absence. The result indicates a di¤erence between
the gender groups in this respect.
Two sets of variables were used to describe di¤erences in family com-
position: indicators for being unmarried, single or divorced (“married” is
the omitted category) and indicatorsfornumberofchildren (“no children”
is the omitted category). In interpreting thenegative coe¢cient estimates
for several of the “number of children” indicators, it should be kept in
mind that, in Sweden, care of dependent children while ill is covered by
a separate insurance, with a somewhat higher replacement level for most
insured workers, i.e., the result can be driven by abuse of this scheme.
The coe¢cient estimates of the age variable are signi…cantly negative
for both men and women in the work-absence state, indicating that older
workers on averagehavelonger work-absence spells. In the work state, the
coe¢cient estimates for the age variable are still negative for both men
and women, indicating that older workers on average have fewer work-
absence spells. One interpretation of these results is that they simply
re‡ect di¤erencesin preferencesbetween older and youngerworkers. They
could, however, also be related to selection over time: workers with high
preferences for being absent either exit the labor force or remain in long
work-absence spells, as time evolves. Workers with low preferences for
being absent will then constitutea larger share of the older workers in the
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We used 14 di¤erent health indicators. Each of them measures a spe-
ci…c health problem except DISAB, which indicates whether or not a
permanent physical handicap prevents a worker from taking all possible
jobs. Descriptive statistics and a short description of each of these vari-
ablesaregiven in TablesA.1 and A.2in Appendix 2. Thehealthindicators
are jointly signi…cant (at all reasonable levels of risk) for both states and
for both genders. In addition, several health indicators are individually
signi…cant. This tells us that health status is, as expected, an important
determinant of di¤erences in preferences for absence from work.
We haveincluded two di¤erent typesof measures ofwork environment:
13 subjective measures of workplace characteristics and two occupation-
speci…c measures of risk exposure (SIR - standardized incidence ratios)
for work accidents and work-related diseases, respectively. Tables A.1 and
A.2 contains descriptive statistics along with a brief description of each of
these indicators.
When interpreting the e¤ects of the work environment variables on
absence from work, it should be kept in mind that these results are likely
to be a¤ected by selection of physically (or mentally) strong workers into
demanding jobs - the so-called “healthy worker e¤ect” (see e.g. Östlin,
1989). The negative estimate for work spells for “jobs with heavy lifting”
(LIFT) and “mentally exhaustive jobs” (EXHM) for men can be inter-
preted as a result of selection. However, several work characteristics, such
as jobswith “unpleasant body positions” (UBP) forboth men and women
and “contact with smoke” (SMOKE) for women, seem to increase work
absence, i.e. they are signi…cantly positive in the work state.
The coe¢cient estimates for the CLOCK and INTIME indicator
variables have the opposite sign from what was expected according to the
discussion in Section 4. INTIME is signi…cant formen in work spellsand
CLOCK is signi…cant forwomen in work absence. A possible explanation
for these results is that timeclocks are used primarily when other forms
of monitoring are not feasible, e.g. in large …rms. These results indicate
that other types of monitoring are likely to be more e¢cient in decreasing
the rate of work absence. They might also re‡ect the fact that unplanned
work absence may be recorded more easily when a timeclock is punched.
Theparameterestimatesmay thereforeindicatethat themeasures ofwork
absence do not in fact include all formsofunscheduled absence from work.
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As noted in the Introduction, the male-female di¤erence in work absence
behaviorhas emerged as a “stylized fact” from empirical research on work
absence. The estimated models can beused to analyze to what extent the
di¤erencesin observablecharacteristicscan explain theobserved behavior.
This analysisisbasedon thecomparison ofthee¤ect ofsubsetsofvariables
included in the model on the predicted mean duration of work or work
absence (Appendix 1 gives the details of the method used to estimate
the mean given a censored sample). In addition, this exercise gives a
measure of the economic signi…cance of the estimated e¤ects, sincegender
di¤erences in observed characteristics can easily be studied by the reader.
We calculate the mean durations in work and work absence for males
(E(w0
mb µm)) and females (E(w0
fb µf)); where wq and b µq; q = m; f are the
mean values of the covariates and the estimated parameters from the dis-
crete time model, respectively. The mean di¤erence in duration for a
subgroup k of variables is then estimated as
¢q(k) = E(wq(k)0b µq) ¡E(w0
qb µq); q =m;f; (9)
where wm(k) = (wk0
f ;w
j0




q ; q = m;f are
the mean of the subgroup k of variables that are taken from the opposite
gender and w
j
q; q = m; f are the means for the sub-group of explanatory
variables that are constant. If ¢q(k) < 0; q = m; f; this implies an in-
creasing hazard to work absence or work from the change in mean values
from wk00
m to wk00
f ; or from wk00
f to wk00
m .
Males are predicted to have on average 11.5 days longer work spells
than females while only 0.3 days shorter work absence spells. Hence, the
result that females on average havea higher work absence rate(see Tables
A.1 and A.2) can beattributed to morefrequent, rather than longer, work
absence spells. We will therefore concentrate the analysis on the gender
di¤erences in the frequencies of the work absence spells.
Table 4 shows the results of the comparison for six di¤erent groups of
variables. The second row shows that if the females would have had the
male mean cost of being absent, then the mean duration of the work spell
would increase by 3 days (from 85 to 88 days). If, on the other hand, the
males would have had the females mean cost, the males mean duration
would decrease by 4 days (from 96.5 to 92.5 days). Since the estimates of
the parameters for the cost of being absent are very similar for males and
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being absent.
Row 3 shows that a decrease in contracted labour time for the males
from 38.94 to 33.92 would prolong the transition to work absence by one
day16 whilean increaseofthe contracted labour timefor thefemales from
33.92 to 38.94 would shorten the transition to work absence by 1.5 day.
That is, interpreting this as a contrafactual result, the male-female dif-
ference in work absence behavior would have been even larger if female
workers would have had the same average number of hours of work as the
male workers.
The results on work environment works in the same direction: men
are on average exposed to inferior work environment compared to women
and using male covariates in the female equation again exaggerates the
di¤erences in work absence. One should, however, be careful in making
a causal interpretation of this result. It is likely that workers with a
strong health select themselves into physically demanding jobs (the so
called “healthy worker e¤ect” which is discussed in Section 6.3). If such
an e¤ect is present, it would result in a negative bias of the causal e¤ect
of work environment on work absence.
Finally, Table 4 shows that male-female di¤erences in health status
seem to have very little e¤ect on observed behavior.
To sum up, ofthe total di¤erence in predicted number of days in work
of 11.5 days we found that about 4 can be explained by di¤erences in
cost of being absent. All other observable characteristics works in the
other direction, i.e., using the male characteristics in the female equation
enlarge the di¤erence. This means that most of the observed di¤erence in
male-femalework absencebehavior can beattributed to gender di¤erences
in unobserved characteristics, i.e., intrinsic di¤erences in work absence
behavior.
15This is true also for the results of the strati…ed model.
16Note, however, that this parameter is insigni…cant for the males subsample.
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work absence.
Males Females
Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val
c -0.031 0.000 -0.033 0.000 -0.023 0.000 -0.029 0.000
„ -0.063 0.000 -0.108 0.000 0.023 0.136 -0.041 0.001
UNEMP -0.007 0.760 -0.016 0.451 -0.021 0.360 -0.029 0.189
Tue -0.020 0.745 -0.020 0.756 0.101 0.112 0.101 0.110
Wed -0.272 0.000 -0.273 0.000 -0.006 0.926 -0.005 0.934
Thu -0.634 0.000 -0.633 0.000 -0.315 0.000 -0.317 0.000
Fri -1.969 0.000 -1.970 0.000 -1.303 0.000 -1.304 0.000
Sat -2.515 0.000 -2.513 0.000 -2.103 0.000 -2.103 0.000
Sun 0.417 0.000 0.419 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.392 0.000
Holi -0.210 0.051 -0.210 0.051 -0.221 0.033 -0.209 0.044
BH -1.059 0.003 -1.055 0.003 -0.606 0.030 -0.587 0.036
July -0.616 0.000 -0.598 0.000 -0.754 0.000 -0.715 0.000
t
c -0.002 0.779 0.007 0.036
Unmarried -0.099 0.105 -0.172 0.005
Divorced 0.255 0.000 0.231 0.004
One child -0.126 0.041 -0.047 0.354
Two children -0.270 0.000 -0.168 0.006
Three children -0.117 0.276 -0.258 0.012
Four children -0.447 0.035 -0.278 0.205
Five children -0.376 0.460 -1.012 0.084
Six children -0.138 0.726
Age -0.010 0.000 -0.012 0.000
DISAB 0.765 0.000 0.896 0.000
NOISE1 -0.036 0.575 0.299 0.000
NOISE2 0.110 0.023 0.049 0.306
SMOKE 0.059 0.218 0.284 0.000
SHAKE 0.090 0.117 -0.117 0.416
POISON 0.044 0.413 -0.020 0.815
LIFT -0.127 0.005 0.138 0.012
HARD -0.012 0.803 0.009 0.856
SWEAT 0.275 0.000 0.036 0.440
EXHM -0.136 0.002 -0.013 0.768
STRESS 0.032 0.460 -0.061 0.168
REP 0.246 0.000 0.059 0.216
MOM 0.047 0.288 -0.061 0.188
UBP 0.142 0.003 0.176 0.000
RISK1 0.000 0.013 -0.000 0.296
RISK2 -0.000 0.024 -0.000 0.429
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FLEX 0.024 0.587 -0.067 0.148
CLOCK 0.071 0.091 0.051 0.324
INTIME 0.131 0.008 0.038 0.482
STRUMA 0.319 0.006
TBC 0.908 0.003 0.500 0.318
HEART 0.312 0.060 0.753 0.000
HBLOOD 0.131 0.091 0.161 0.056
ULCER 0.099 0.381 0.321 0.011
HEMORR 0.309 0.001 0.106 0.267
PREGNANT 0.211 0.048
HERNIA -0.167 0.478 -0.165 0.715
VAV 0.346 0.001 0.083 0.313
MENTAL 0.018 0.945 -1.291 0.029
CANCER 0.072 0.706 -0.031 0.878
DIABETIC 0.022 0.900 0.509 0.001
NEURO 0.129 0.539 -0.622 0.050
7 Conclusions
Like a numberofprevious paperson work absence, thisstudy supports the
view that economic incentives a¤ect work absence behavior. It is shown
that di¤erences in costs for being absent can explain about one third
of the observed male-female di¤erence in the frequency of work absence
spells. This, in turn, implies that a smaller gender wage gap will decrease
the di¤erences in the observed work absence behavior between men and
women.
Another interesting result is that women seem to be more sensitive to
exposure to bad work conditions in their work absencebehavior. This was
seen directly in the Kaplan-Meier survival graphs, where the di¤erence
between those exposed and not exposed to bad work condition werelarger
for the females than for the males, as well as when predicting the change
in work absence behavior from using the males workplace attributes in
the female equations. A somewhat related result, which is suported in the
theoretical model, is that the contracted number of hours of work a¤ects
work absence. The results of the predictions indicate that the gender
di¤erences in work absence would have been greater if women on average
would have worked the same number of hours as males.
Finally, our results also shows that most of the male-female di¤erence
in work absencebehaviorcannot beexplained by di¤erencesin characteris-
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Males Females
Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val
c 0.005 0.185 0.005 0.217 0.001 0.850 -0.002 0.544
„ 0.017 0.284 -0.002 0.892 -0.032 0.015 -0.054 0.000
UNEMP 0.011 0.572 0.011 0.556 0.005 0.818 0.010 0.605
Tue 0.039 0.583 0.038 0.596 0.193 0.007 0.198 0.006
Wed 0.027 0.710 0.026 0.717 0.222 0.002 0.227 0.001
Thu -0.168 0.025 -0.165 0.028 0.119 0.099 0.120 0.095
Fri 1.019 0.000 1.013 0.000 1.023 0.000 1.017 0.000
Sat -0.953 0.000 -0.967 0.000 -0.714 0.000 -0.720 0.000
Sun 0.300 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.403 0.000 0.401 0.000
Holi -0.058 0.613 -0.099 0.382 -0.109 0.355 -0.085 0.472
BH 0.037 0.858 -0.013 0.949 0.005 0.981 -0.014 0.946
July -0.213 0.009 -0.193 0.016 -0.234 0.011 -0.218 0.017
t
c -0.002 0.683 0.003 0.274
Unmarried 1.041 0.488 -0.005 0.927
Divorced 0.997 0.977 -0.057 0.452
One child -0.013 0.824 -0.039 0.408
Two children -0.037 0.558 -0.065 0.249
Three children 0.158 0.121 -0.143 0.125
Four children 0.161 0.393 -0.486 0.015
Five children 0.531 0.247 -1.044 0.075
Six children -0.226 0.541
Age -0.013 0.000 -0.009 0.000
Disab -0.589 0.000 -0.358 0.004
NOISE1 0.183 0.003 -0.069 0.374
NOISE2 0.069 0.119 -0.050 0.263
SMOKE -0.034 0.449 0.024 0.623
SHAKE -0.184 0.001 -0.135 0.323
POISON -0.041 0.409 0.221 0.008
LIFT 0.051 0.225 0.019 0.716
HARD 0.008 0.866 0.013 0.759
SWEAT -0.068 0.113 -0.111 0.012
EXHM -0.006 0.886 0.108 0.011
STRESS 0.036 0.368 -0.072 0.074
REP 0.031 0.470 -0.063 0.160
MOM -0.164 0.000 -0.048 0.261
UBP 0.029 0.518 -0.073 0.113
RISK1 0.000 0.914 0.000 0.635
RISK2 -0.000 0.559 -0.000 0.495
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FLEX -0.027 0.502 -0.137 0.002
CLOCK -0.036 0.356 -0.207 0.000
INTIME -0.006 0.903 -0.033 0.510
STRUMA 0.788 0.308 -0.015 0.895
TBC 0.475 0.114 -0.458 0.356
HEART -0.197 0.211 -0.466 0.011
HBLOOD -0.112 0.132 -0.297 0.000
ULCER -0.013 0.897 -0.109 0.357
HEMORR 0.118 0.209 0.078 0.380
PREGNANT -0.257 0.008
HERNIA -0.231 0.267 -0.708 0.074
VAV -0.142 0.134 -0.023 0.764
MENTAL -0.356 0.159 -0.010 0.982
CANCER -0.682 0.000 -0.275 0.153
DIABETIC -0.168 0.310 -0.311 0.026
NEURO 0.133 0.512 0.072 0.799
Table 3: Results from the strati…ed analysis.
Males Females
Hazard from Incidence Hazard from Incidence
Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val
c 0.007 0.350 -0.026 0.000 0.013 0.061 -0.033 0.000
„ -0.003 0.946 0.004 0.924 -0.006 0.839 0.033 0.271
UNEMP -0.044 0.291 0.003 0.945 -0.117 0.007 0.064 0.176
Tue 0.019 0.842 0.005 0.951 0.189 0.040 0.110 0.189
Wed -0.038 0.692 -0.205 0.018 0.239 0.008 -0.125 0.142
Thu -0.233 0.020 -0.579 0.000 0.146 0.115 -0.327 0.000
Fri 1.271 0.000 -2.060 0.000 1.237 0.000 -1.308 0.000
Sat -1.142 0.000 -2.765 0.000 -0.630 0.000 -2.136 0.000
Sun 0.031 0.768 0.418 0.000 0.273 0.012 0.360 0.000
Holi -0.143 0.389 -0.198 0.140 -0.329 0.055 -0.294 0.020
BH -0.226 0.448 -0.544 0.156 -0.116 0.682 -0.544 0.090
July -0.217 0.055 -0.817 0.000 -0.225 0.060 -0.864 0.000
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performing the experiment of using the means of the observed variables
for females in the male equation and the mean of the male characteristics
in the female equation respectively.
Group of variables ¢m(k) ¢f(k)
Personal characteristics 2 -2
c -4 3
Contracted hours of work (tc) 1¤ -1.5
Work environment 9 -11.5
Health status -0.5 -0.5
Secondary cost -0.0 -0.5
* This parameter was not signi…cant in the Cox regression model
ticsincluded intheestimation. Given thedetailedcharacteristicsincluded,
the background to this result is likely to be intrinsical di¤erences in male-
female work absence behavior. This implies that the compulsory sickness
insurance with a premium which is more or less proportional to the in-
sured incomewill redistributeincome from men to women compared to an
insurance market where the insurer is able to price discriminate between
male and female workers. This applies even if the economic incentives to
be present at work would have been the same for men and women.
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The problem of estimating the mean of a random variable, given a
censored sample, was addressed as follows. From the censored sample, we
estimated the survival function by the method given in Kaplan and Meier
(1958). This estimator is a discrete distribution function. We calculated
the mean in this distribution and used it as our estimator of the mean in
the original distribution.
This estimator has two obvious properties: (i) it is easy to calculate,
and (ii) it coincides with the sample mean when there is no censoring.
Its general large-sample properties in the case of uninformative censoring
remain to be investigated. A negative bias might be expected, since the
largest values tend to be censored more frequently than small values.
Supposethat, from(a censored) sample, wehaveestimated thesurvival
function S of the random variable T by ^ S, where ^ S has support t =(t1 <
t2 < : :: ;< tk). Then ^ S is the survival function of a discrete random
variable T¤, with
P(T¤ =ti) = ^ S(ti) ¡ ^ S(ti+); i =1; :: :; k:






^ S(ti¡) ¡ ^ S(ti)
´
:
Now we obviously de…ne our estimator as
^ E(T) =E(T¤): (10)
Suppose for the moment that censoring is of Type I, i.e., the items
has a common (potential) censoring time t = T0. Then our estimator
^ E(T), given in (10), is an unbiased estimator of the conditional expecta-
tion E(TjT · T0) which, of course, is smaller than the quantity we want
to estimate. It would also be impossible to …nd an unbiased (nonpara-
metric) estimator of the mean, since we have no information about the
distribution above t =T0.
The conclusion from this procedure is that our estimator is an esti-
mator of the conditional expectation E(TjT ·tk), where tk is the largest
observed event time in our sample. It should kept in mind, however, that
even with this formulation, ourestimator isbiased undercertain censoring
patterns.
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Table A.1: Decriptive statistics, all individuals in the data set, males and
females
Variab le M ean StdD ev M ean S td Dev
M ales (n= 738) Females (n= 658)
Numb er of d ays absent 1990 27.1526 58.0451 32.5808 65.4579
Numb er of d ays absent 1991 27.3978 65.2519 34.1905 71.9869
Personal Ch aracteristics
MA RR (married ) 0.6962 0.4602 0.7530 0.4316
DIV (divorced ) 0.0490 0.2161 0.0976 0.2969
AGE 39.3324 11.8957 41.2881 11.8919
DISAB (disabled ) 0.0259 0.1589 0.0274 0.1635
NRCH (numb er of children un der 16) 0.6471 0.9963 0.7088 0.9911
Economic Incentives
c (cost of being absent 1990) 3.9274 0.9423 3.5000 0.8768
c (cost of being absent 1991) 16.0930 4.2678 14.9043 4.4700
„ (virtu al income 1990 (10¡2)) 5.6837 1.4910 6.1463 1.6401
„ (virtu al income 1991 (10¡2)) 4.1898 1.1886 4.6563 1.5790
tc (contracted daily workin g hou rs) 38.9414 4.1088 33.9207 7.5088
Work En viron ment
NOISE 1 (noisy environ ment) 0.1798 0.3843 0.0488 0.2156
NOISE 2 (noisy environ ment) 0.4414 0.4969 0.2256 0.4183
SM OK E (exposed to gas, du st or smoke) 0.3460 0.4760 0.1738 0.3792
SHAK E (exp osed to strong sh aking or vibrations) 0.1471 0.3545 0.0183 0.1341
PO IS ON (exposed to gas, du st or smoke) 0.1594 0.3663 0.0442 0.2057
LIF T (heavy lifting) 0.3501 0.4773 0.1570 0.3641
HARD (work is p hysically exh austing) 0.5858 0.4929 0.6098 0.4882
SW EAT (work causes daily sweatin g) 0.3815 0.4861 0.2881 0.4532
EXH M (work is metally exhausting) 0.3229 0.4679 0.4680 0.4994
STRE SS (work is stressfu ll) 0.6049 0.4892 0.6829 0.4657
REP (work is rep etitive) 0.2548 0.4360 0.2607 0.4393
MO M (monoton ous movemen ts) 0.4946 0.5003 0.5640 0.4963
UBP (u npleasent b ody position s) 0.6063 0.4889 0.5457 0.4983
RIS K1 (SIR, work accid ents) 1623.5014 1038.5457 924.6951 865.3817
RIS K2 (SIR, work-related diseases) 1871.7984 1013.1511 615.7774 455.8679
Health Status
STRUM A 0.0027 0.0522 0.0198 0.1395
TBC (tu berculosis) 0.0027 0.0522 0.0015 0.0390
HEA RT (heart p roblems) 0.0177 0.1320 0.0061 0.0779
HBLOO D (high blood presu re) 0.0790 0.2700 0.0686 0.2530
ULCER (gastric u lcer) 0.0259 0.1589 0.0198 0.1395
HEM O RR (hemorrhoids) 0.0381 0.1917 0.0488 0.2156
PRE GNA NT (di¢cult pregnacy) 0.0000 — – 0.9345 0.2477
HERN IA 0.0095 0.0973 0.0030 0.0552
VAV (varicose vein s) 0.0300 0.1706 0.0762 0.2656
ME NTAL (mentally ill) 0.0041 0.0638 0.0061 0.0779
CANCER 0.0123 0.1101 0.0107 0.1028
DIABE TIC 0.0191 0.1369 0.0107 0.1028
NEU RO (neurological illness) 0.0054 0.0737 0.0046 0.0675
S econ dary cost
UNE MP (M on th ly mun icip al un employment rate 1990) 1.6603 0.6516 1.5995 0.6037
UNE MP (M oth ly muncipal un employment rate 1991) 3.1772 0.7512 3.1012 0.7155
FLE X (‡exible working sch ed ule) 0.6499 0.4773 0.6936 0.4614
CLOCK (use of timeclock) 0.4264 0.4949 0.2759 0.4473
INTIM E (imp ortant to b e on time) 0.7480 0.4345 0.8262 0.3792
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of both work-absence and work-presence (i.e., individuals who change
state).
Variab le Mean S td Dev M ean S tdDev
M ales (n = 635) Females (n = 591)
Nu mb er of days absent 1990 28.5568 53.7334 33.1322 60.9637
Nu mb er of days absent 1991 28.8407 62.5735 34.9220 68.6455
Person al Characteristics
M ARR (married) 0.6924 0.4619 0.7576 0.4289
DIV (d ivorced) 0.0521 0.2223 0.1000 0.3003
AGE 38.6893 11.8715 40.7949 11.7339
DISAB (d isab led) 0.0205 0.1418 0.0220 0.1469
NRCH (nu mb er of children u nder 16) 0.6562 0.9969 0.7458 0.9973
E conomic In centives
c (cost of b eing ab sent 1990) 3.9264 0.9478 3.4906 0.8811
c (cost of b eing ab sent 1990) 16.0120 4.1482 14.8284 4.3133
„ (virtual income 1990 (10¡2)) 5.6415 1.4939 6.1234 1.5830
„ (virtual income 1991 (10¡2)) 4.1816 1.1907 4.6695 1.5970
tc (contracted d aily working h ours) 39.0063 4.0420 33.9169 7.4718
Work E nvironment
NO IS E1 (noisy environment) 0.1767 0.3817 0.0525 0.2233
NO IS E2 (noisy environment) 0.4527 0.4981 0.2254 0.4182
SM O KE (exp osed to gas, d ust or smoke) 0.3502 0.4774 0.1780 0.3828
SH AKE (exp osed to stron g shaking or v ib rations) 0.1483 0.3556 0.0186 0.1354
P OISON (exp osed to gas, d ust or smoke) 0.1562 0.3633 0.0492 0.2164
LIFT (heavy lif tin g) 0.3438 0.4754 0.1644 0.3710
HARD (work is physically exhausting) 0.6025 0.4898 0.6220 0.4853
SW E AT (work cau ses daily sweating) 0.3943 0.4891 0.2949 0.4564
E XHM (work is metally exhau stin g) 0.3170 0.4657 0.4797 0.5000
STRE SS (work is stressfu ll) 0.6073 0.4887 0.6797 0.4670
RE P (work is rep etitive) 0.2697 0.4442 0.2678 0.4432
M MO (monotonous movements) 0.5047 0.5004 0.5576 0.4971
UBP (unp leasent b od y p ositions) 0.6246 0.4846 0.5593 0.4969
RISK1 (S IR, work acciden ts) 1641.5615 1057.3726 930.1695 863.0728
RISK2 (S IR, work-related diseases) 1883.5962 1032.5886 620.7627 457.4012
Health Status
STRUM A 0.0032 0.0561 0.0220 0.1469
TBC (tub ercu losis) 0.0016 0.0397 0.0017 0.0412
HE ART (h eart problems) 0.0158 0.1247 0.0068 0.0821
HBLOD (high blood presu re) 0.0757 0.2647 0.0644 0.2457
ULCE R (gastric ulcer) 0.0252 0.1570 0.0186 0.1354
HE MO R (hemorrh oid s) 0.0347 0.1832 0.0475 0.2128
P REG NANT (d i¢ cult p regnacy) 0.0000 — – 0.9356 0.2457
HE RNIA 0.0095 0.0969 0.0034 0.0582
VAV (varicose vein s) 0.0331 0.1791 0.0729 0.2602
M ENTAL (mentally ill) 0.0047 0.0687 0.0051 0.0712
CANCE R 0.0126 0.1117 0.0119 0.1084
DIABETIC 0.0174 0.1307 0.0119 0.1084
NE URO (n eurological illn ess) 0.0063 0.0792 0.0051 0.0712
Second ary cost
UNE M P (M onthly mun icipal u nemp loyment rate 1990) 1.6545 0.6456 1.5953 0.6096
UNE M P (M onthly mun icipal u nemp loyment rate 1991) 3.1761 0.7476 3.0932 0.7196
FLE X (‡ exible workin g schedule) 0.6562 0.4754 0.6966 0.4601
CLOCK (use of timeclock ) 0.4211 0.4941 0.2797 0.4492
INTIM E (imp ortan t to be on time) 0.7539 0.4311 0.8339 0.3725
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